The Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo marks the end of Chevron deference and fundamentally reshapes the administrative law landscape. In its wake, agencies must now defend regulatory action without the benefit of the judiciary’s longstanding presumption in favor of that agency’s statutory interpretations. Against this backdrop, the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) attempted to classify certain strains and quantities of Salmonella as adulterants under the Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA)—an interpretation that marked a sharp departure from decades of prior agency position. Although the proposed rule was withdrawn before finalization by the Trump Administration, unresolved questions remain about how such a rule would fare under the post-Chevron framework.
This Note argues that after Loper Bright, agencies must proactively structure both their rulemaking and litigation strategies around the Skidmore framework. Using the FSIS proposed rule as a case study, this Note offers a strategic model for how agencies can craft and defend regulations to improve their chances of surviving judicial review in a post-Chevron administrative regime.